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Abstract of Master’s Thesis - Academic Year 2018
Blockchain Storage Load Balancing
Among DHT Clustered Nodes
In Bitcoin, to independently verify whether new transactions are correct or
not, a type of a node called “Full Node” has to hold the whole of historical
transactions. The transactions are stored in ledger called “Blockchain.”
Blockchain is an append-only data structure. Thus, to operate Full Nodes,
the required storage capacity would grow too large for resource-constrained
devices. Due to the limitation, the existing lightweight node scheme is that
a node relies on other Full Nodes. In this thesis, to reduce storage capacity
with keeping the independence of each node, we propose a storage load
balancing scheme “KARAKASA” using Distributed Hash Table (DHT). In
KARAKASA, nodes distributedly keep the whole blockchain among DHT
networked nodes. We evaluated KARAKASA from the view of storage
capacity and independence. As a result, a node in a cluster does not need
to trust other nodes. We concluded that nodes in a DHT cluster can behave
like Full Nodes without holding the whole blockchain.
Keywords :
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修士論文要旨 2018年度 (平成30年度)
分散ハッシュテーブルを用いた
Blockchainストレージのロードバランシング
Bitcoinでは，新規取引の正当性を独立して検証するために， 「Full
Node」と呼ばれるタイプのノードは過去の取引データを全て保持
する．取引データは，「Blockchain」と呼ばれる台帳に保存され
る．Blockchainは，追記のみ可能なデータ構造である．そのため，ノー
ドをFull Nodeとして動作させるために必要とされるストレージ容量は
肥大化し続ける．したがって，ストレージ容量に制約のあるデバイス
をFull Nodeとして動作させることは困難である．また，既存の軽量ノー
ドは，検証のために他のFull Nodeに依存しなければならない．本論文で
は，各ノードの独立性を保ちながら必要とされるストレージ容量を軽
減するために，分散ハッシュテーブル（DHT）を用いた負荷分散方式
「KARAKASA」を提案した． KARAKASAでは，ノードはDHTクラス
タ内でBlockchain全体を分散的に保存する．提案手法の評価として，ス
トレージ容量と独立性の観点から分析を行なった．その結果，クラス
タ内のノードは他のノードを信頼する必要はなく，DHTクラスタ内の
ノードは，Blockchain全体を保存せずともFull Nodeと同様に動作可能で
ある．
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Bitcoin [1] is a peer-to-peer electronic payment system. Bitcoin was
invented by “Satoshi Nakamoto1” in 2009. In Bitcoin, each node store
transactions in a public ledger. The public ledger is called “Blockchain.”
Each node can verify the correctness of new transactions by referring to the
blockchain stored in local storage. Each node stores verified transactions in
the blockchain in the local storage. Each node stores transactions as a unit
“Block.” Block includes verified transactions.
Typically, to verify new transactions, a type of Bitcoin node called “Full
Node” has to hold the whole blockchain. Full Nodes can verify all new
transactions locally. Thus, each Full Nodes can behave without depending
on other nodes.
To behave as a Full Node, each node requires enough amount of storage.
The blockchain is append-only data storage scheme. Therefore, the data
size of the whole blockchain keeps growing. Fig. 1.1 shows the size of the
Bitcoin blockchain. The size is rapidly increasing from the time that the
system started in 2009, and in December 2018, the size is about 200GB. For
this characteristic, to operate a Full Node, users need to prepare enough
storage capacity. Moreover, users also need to add storage continually
according to growing the blockchain. Therefore, users are difficult to operate
1Anonymous individuals or groups who call them “Satoshi Nakamoto.”
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Figure 1.1: Bitcoin Blockchain Size Grows
a resource-constrained device (e.g., smartphone) as Full Nodes.
To address this issue, there should be a node architecture for a storage
resource-constrained device to independently verify transactions so that like
a Full Node. The architecture needs to reduce the required storage capacity
for a node. There are some lightweight node architecture proposals such
as SPV (Simple Payment Verification) [2]. The existing lightweight node
architecture is that a lightweight node relies on Full Nodes. Therefore,
existing lightweight nodes cannot verify transactions independently. In
other words, the availability of existing lightweight nodes depends on the
availability of Full Nodes it is relying on. Hence, without Full Nodes that
lightweight nodes rely on, users of existing lightweight nodes cannot verify
2
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whether their transactions are processed normally in the Bitcoin network or
not.
This thesis presents a storage load balancing scheme “KARAKASA.” In
KARAKASA scheme, resource-constrained devices can verify transactions
and blocks same as Full Nodes while reducing storage size requirement.
We adopt a Distributed Hash Table(DHT)-based distributed storage to the
storage of Bitcoin nodes. DHTs such as Chord [3] realize effective node
assignment for a block and lookup of Key-Value to peer-to-peer networked
nodes. In KARAKASA, a subset of nodes in the Bitcoin network builds
DHT clusters. Each node in clusters can behave as a Full Node; verify new
transactions by referring others without keeping the whole blockchain.
By adopting securing methods for DHT [4], compared with existing
lightweight schemes, nodes in KARAKASA scheme keep the independent
validation. Currently, a user should choice Full Nodes or node relying on
Full Node. In other words, a user who has only resource-constrained devices
needs to trust a Full Node that another user operates. By KARAKASA
scheme, the user can operate a Bitcoin node without trusting another user.
1.1 Organization of This Thesis
The thesis is organized as follows; In Chapter 2, we explain Bitcoin and
DHT as background materials. In Chapter 3, we discuss the issue of Bitcoin
nodes. In Chapter 4, we present KARAKASA scheme and how to load
balance the Bitcoin node storage using DHT. In Chapter 5, we describe the
evaluation plan of KARAKASA. In Chapter 6, we analyze KARAKASA from
two point of views; storage capacity for a node in KARAKASA scheme and
independent validation of transactions and blocks from security analysis of
KARAKASA scheme. In Chapter 7, we compare KARAKASA scheme with
Full Node and existing lightweight node scheme. In Chapter 8, we introduce
some works about existing lightweight nodes. In Chapter 9, we conclude this
thesis and discuss possible future works.
3
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Background
In this chapter, we describe the elemental technology of our work. First,
we describe Bitcoin. Bitcoin is a first cryptocurrency based on the blockchain.
Next, we describe Distributed Hash Table (DHT). DHT is a scheme for
realizing efficient assignment and lookup in a peer-to-peer network.
2.1 Bitcoin
This section describes how Bitcoin and Bitcoin nodes work. Users can
operate Bitcoin nodes without depending on other nodes. It is considered a
revolution in distributed systems.
2.1.1 Bitcoin Overview
Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer payment system. Users show a payment
of Bitcoin by creating and broadcasting data called “transaction.” The
unit of Bitcoin is “BTC1.” The inventor of Bitcoin focused on salving
“double-spending issue.” Double-spending is like followings; An attacker
pays a coin to another user. Then, the attacker pays the same coin to
10.001 BTC is called 1 mBTC, 0.001 mBTC is called 1 µBTC, and 0.001 µBTC is
called 1 satoshi.
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different users. To detect double spending, nodes store all transactions in
a blockchain. Nodes store transactions as a unit of blocks. When a user
pay Bitcoins, a node make a new transaction and broadcast to other nodes.
When nodes receive a new transaction, nodes verify its correctness. Nodes
verify with referring the local copy of the blockchain. Some of the nodes
collect verified transactions and form a new block. Similar to transaction, a
node broadcasts a new block. Other nodes receive it and verify. If the block
is verified, nodes store the block in the local copy of the blockchain.
To show the order of blocks and of transactions included in blocks, Bitcoin
uses chain of hash. A block includes a hash value of the previous block
in the header. Additionally, the hash of the block is required lower than
the predetermined difficulty value. Each node calculates the difficulty from
per the last 2016 blocks in the blockchain. To create a block data that
matches the requirement, a node needs to repeatedly calculate the hash
value of the block with replacing data. The replaced data has no meaning.
Once the node successfully creates a block that satisfies the requirement, the
node broadcasts the block to the Bitcoin network. At this time, there is
a possibility that another node broadcasts another block that refers to the
same previous block. This situation is called a “fork.” When a fork happens,
a node needs to choose one of contradicting blocks. In Bitcoin, a node selects
a block so that the sum of the difficulty in local blockchain is the largest.
There is an incentive mechanism to spend computation power to make a
block. A node that makes a new block can get a reward as some Bitcoins.
The reward is 12.5 BTC in December 2018. From a metaphor of gold mining,
the block making process is called “mining” and the user working on mining
is called “miner.”
To withdraw transactions or to falsify, an attacker may try to rewrite
a transaction. Then, the attacker rewrites a block that includes the
transaction. Therefore, the hash value of the rewritten block would changes.
The following block includes the hash value of the rewritten block. By the
hash chain structure, hash values of all blocks following the rewritten block
5
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would change. Thus, the attacker needs to rewrite all block starting from the
following block of rewritten block towards the latest one. It means that the
attacker needs to rebuild another blockchain. At the same time, other honest
nodes may create a new block that connects to the latest block in a existing
blockchain. Hence, the attacker needs to make blocks more quickly, so that
the attacker needs more computation power than honest ones. Whether a
miner can make a block during the particular time is probabilistic. It depends
on the computational power of the node apply. Hence, an attack success is
probabilistic too. The inventor of Bitcoin showed attack success probability
by random walk and Poisson distribution [1].
2.1.2 Bitcoin Transaction and Block Data Structure
This section shows Bitcoin transaction data and block data structure.
Fig. 2.1 shows the data structure of a transaction [5]. A transaction
contains one or more TxInputs (TxIn) and TxOutputs (TxOut). In TxOut,
LockingScript (it contains a template script ScriptPubKey) specify the
requirement for paying coins. The amount of the coin also described in
Amount field. A TxIn refers to a previous TxOut. UnlockingScript (it
contains a template script ScriptSig) field in the TxIn shows that the creator
of the transaction matches the requirement written in the referred TxOut.
TxOuts that have not been referred by any TxIns in any other transactions
are called “Unspent Transaction Output (UTXO).”
Fig. 2.2 shows the block data structure. A block consists of block header
and list of transactions. block header includes the followings; a hash value
of the previous block hashPrevBlock), Markle root of transactions in the
block (hashMarkleRoot), a target of Proof-of-Work (Bits), and a count of
Proof-of-Work trial (Nonce). The hashMarkleRoot is a digest of the list of
transactions in the block. Therefore, a hash of the block header can be taken
as the digest of block. The hashPrevBlock is the hash of the block header
of the previous block. The hashPrevBlock should satisfy the requirement
described in Section 2.1.1.
6
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2.1.3 Bitcoin Transaction Verification and Node
Storage
When each node receives a transaction, the nodes verify the transaction
by the referring UTXOs. Fig. 2.3 shows Bitcoin transaction verification
process and the relationship with node storages. To search UTXO in every
verification process, a node needs to access the blockcahin in the local storage.
To search efficiently UTXOs, in Bitcoin Core [6], one of the implementations
of Bitcoin, UTXO is pooled in a memory area. The memory area is
called “UTXOset.” Nodes use it for transaction verification. Additionally,
nodes store verified transactions in “TXPool.” Nodes create a block from
transactions stored in TXPool.
Full Node
Client
Full Node
Full Node
TX
Hash
TX
TX
TX
Hash
TX
TX
TX
Hash
TX
TX
Storage
Memory
TxOut A
TxOut B
TxOut C
TxOut D
TxOut E
TxOut F
UTXOset
TX
Pointer 
to TxOut A 
New  
TxOut
TXPool
TX A
TX B
TX C
TX D
TX E
TX F
① Client makes and  
broadcasts a new TX.
④ Broadcast the new TX to peers
② Verify the new TX by 
referring TXPool and the 
UTXOset in the memory.
③ If the new TX is verified, 
store it to the TXPool.
When to verify TX 
1) Reciving TX has not been included in the TXPool. 
2) TxIns refer TxOuts in the UTXOset.
Figure 2.3: Verify Process and Node Storage of Bitcoin Transactions
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Simple Payment Verification(SPV)
The inventor of Bitcoin pointed out that Bitcoin is not scalable because
of the append-only characteristics of the blockchain [1]. Hence, the inventor
proposed a lightweight verification scheme. The scheme is called Simple
Payment Verification (SPV). By SPV, a node processes the verification by
referring information in active and on-line Full Nodes. Therefore, the node
using SPV does not download the whole blockchain. A node using SPV holds
only the block header chain instead of the whole blockchain. A node using
SPV is called “SPV node.”
SPV nodes can verify whether a new block is valid or not by checking
the hashPrevBlock. It is the same verification process in Full Nodes. The
difference is in the transaction verification process. Generally, A SPV node
does not verify all transactions. The SPV node verifies transactions that
describe payment to the user of the SPV node. A transaction in a blockchain
is verified by a miner. Additionally, when other nodes accept a block include
the transaction, the nodes also verify the transaction. Hence, a transaction
in a blockchain can be considered as correct. The SPV node verifies a
transaction by checking whether the transaction is included a block in a
blockchain or not. When an SPV node verifies a transaction, the SPV node
gets a Markle subtree from Full Nodes that the SPV node relies on. By
using the Markle subtree, the SPV node can verify whether a transaction
is included in a block or not. This SPV process does not need the whole
blockchain. However, this process depends on whether the relied Full Nodes
are honest.
2.1.4 Bitcoin Node and Roles
There are five Bitcoin node roles; holding blockchain, verifying new
transaction and blocks, mining, P2P networking, and wallet. Each node
has some or all role of those. Nodes that has all role is called “Full Node.”
Ideally, all nodes should be Full Nodes. Then, nodes do not require to trust
10
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each other nodes. However, some roles need computation power or enough
storage capacity. Thus, to use Bitcoin, resource-constrained nodes trust other
nodes. They depend on the execution of some function on other nodes.
A node holding the entire of blockchain can detect and resolve forks.
Forks happen by rewriting previous transactions or propagation delay of
blocks. The probability of a fork is never 0. A node can create a new block
that refers to a particular block that is already referred by another block
created by other nodes. The new block can be accepted by other nodes
with satisfying the selection rule described in Section 2.1.1. When a node
observes a fork, the node needs to decide which is correct by referring to a
previous block. Therefore, nodes need to keep all blocks. From another point
of view, if a node leaves a network, other nodes holding the blockchain are
not affected. They hold all data required to verify new transactions. On the
other hand, an SPV node would not be available when the relied Full Node
leaves. Hence, holding the whole blockchain contributes to the availability of
the Bitcoin node.
Verifications of new transactions and blocks are stateless. Therefore,
with keeping the whole blockchain, a node can verify and collect correct
transactions and blocks independently from other nodes. Nodes need UTXOs
for transactions verification. Nodes need the whole blockchain for blocks
verification also.
Mining is a work for the confirmation of transactions also. By mining, A
transaction is inserted in a block, and the block appended to the blockchain.
Basically, rewriting the transaction in the blockchain is difficult according to
honest computation power in the Bitcoin network and to how many blocks
stacked on the block that includes the transaction. To work on mining, a
node needs verified transactions and the last block in a blockchain.
P2P networking is used for propagating transactions and blocks. Nodes
relay verified transactions and blocks. All nodes try to reach a consensus on
only one blockchain in the network. There are several works focus on Bitcoin
networks [7, 8, 9]. These works showed that it is necessary that enough
11
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number of Full Nodes share correct transactions and blocks.
Wallet function makes transactions for a payment. A wallet needs to
recognize UTXOs that are associated with the wallet owner. The wallet also
holds a cryptographic key pair. When the wallet makes a transaction, the
wallet signs a new TxIn to express that the user is authorized to use a TxOut.
2.1.5 Bootstrapping Full Nodes
This section describes the process of bootstrapping Full Nodes. To
bootstrap a Full Node, the Full Node needs to discover peers in the Bitcoin
network. After that, the Full Node gets the whole blockchain.
In Bitcoin Core, there are several schemes to discover nodes [10]. The
primary schemes are followings; selecting IP addresses that an operator of
the Full Node knows and sending a message of node discovering protocol
to near hosts, or getting the IP address of Full Nodes from trusted parties.
The third scheme is a default scheme in Bitcoin Core version 0.6 or later.
The trusted party uses the DNS scheme [11]. The trusted party is called
“seed DNS.” A bootstrapped Full Node resolves some domains. Then, the
bootstrapped Full Node can get addresses of Bitcoin nodes associated with
the domains. The domains are included in Bitcoin Core source code. If the
bootstrapped Full Node fails to resolve domains, the bootstrapped Full Node
try to connect directly addresses that are included in the source code.
The bootstrapped Full Node retrieves the whole blockchain from the
connected Bitcoin nodes. The connected Bitcoin nodes send blocks. Since
the first block is included in the Bitcoin Core source code, the bootstrapped
Full Node can verify all block from the second block to the latest block.
The bootstrapped Full Node verifies the received blocks. After receiving
and verifying the latest block, the bootstrapped Full Node can behave
independently.
The point of bootstrapping is that a Full Node verifies all block start from
the first block to the latest block before acting as a active Full Node. When
an operator wants to restart an inactive bitcoin node, the Bitcoin process also
12
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verifies the blocks in the storage. After verification, the Full Node receives
blocks missing on the Full Nodes, up to the latest blocks on the blockchain.
2.1.6 Cryptocurrency Exchange Service
In this decade, not only Bitcoin, many cryptocurrencies based on
blockchain scheme were proposed. Those cryptocurrencies have different
characteristic. One of the famous cryptocurrency is Ethereum [12].
Ethereum is an application platform as well as a cryptocurrency. In
Ethereum users can run programs called “Smart Contract.”
Some cryptocurrency exchange services provide exchanging
cryptocurrencies and fiat money like American Dollar. They also provide a
cryptocurrency payment service. Those cryptocurrency exchange services are
provided as web services and smartphone applications and so on. Standard
architecture of cryptocurrency exchange services is discussed. Fig 2.4
shows standard service architecture that proposed in an Internet-Draft [13].
Generally, a service provider provides a server and operates the server as a
Full Node. The client application requests processing payment to the server.
Then, the server creates transactions and broadcasts it to a cryptocurrency
network.
In 2018, there were several incidents that attackers hacked those
services [14, 15]. The attacker maliciously sends cryptocurrencies instead of
users. Those incidents were caused by hacking key management component
and sign using user’s secret key. In cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, the
ownership of coin is generally based on ownership of secret key. Hence, the
architecture like Fig. 2.4 means that the security of user’s cryptocurrency
depends on the service provider.
From another aspect, when a user sends some cryptocurrencies another,
the architecture lacks transparency for users. When a user requests sending,
a Full Node in a service provider creates transaction and broadcasts it to a
cryptocurrency network. At that time, because the client the user using is
not a Full Node, the user cannot verify whether the transaction is created
13
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Figure 2.4: Architecture of Cryptocurrency Exchange Service cited from [13]
and broadcasted correctly or not. Bitcoin is designed as all nodes verify
transactions and blocks independently. Hence, the cryptocurrency exchange
service is not fitting to the design of Bitcoin.
2.2 DHT (Distributed Hash Table)
DHT is a design to implement a hash table among peer-to-peer networked
nodes. Before Stoica et al. introduced a DHT implementation called
“Chord”, consistent hashing [16] was used for key mapping in distributed
systems. Consistent hashing is a design sharing a hash table among
14
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predetermined nodes. There was a problem that consistent hashing is not
scalable with joining nodes. DHT is solving the problem by updating routing
table dynamically. In DHT, each of the nodes store key mapping. It
allows data location to be decided and be able to lookup in a distributed
Key-Value-Store (KVS).
ID:20
ID:70ID:120
ID:250
ID:55
ID IP
Predecessor 20 192.168.56.3
Successors1 120 192.168.56.4
Successors2 250 192.168.56.5
Routing table of 
node 70
Figure 2.5: Chord overlay network and key mapping
Chord [3], one of the many DHT designs, uses a ring-shaped overlay
network. Fig. 2.5 shows an example of Chord overlay network and key
mapping. The nodes and the data are mapped in a ring overlay network.
A data ID is determined by calculating the hash value of data. A node ID
is determined by the hash value of the node’s IP address. A node uses a
data IDs as the key for searching data from the distributed KVS. Nodes
are responsible for returning data that are assigned IDs between an ID just
15
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after the previous node on the Chord ring and an ID of the node self. For
example, in Fig. 2.5, the node ID 70 stores the data assigned to data ID
55. Each node has a routing table. The table includes next nodes in ring
overlay (Successors) and previous (Predecessor). Additionally, the routing
table includes routes to some nodes for efficient routing (Finger). By the
routing table, when a network consists of N nodes, key mapping lookup
requires O(logN) messages. When nodes join or leave, each node updates
the routing table. The process is called “stabilizing.” In Chord, updating the
routing table requires only O(log2N). Chord provides an efficient scheme of
calculating the location of data with few constraints on the applications [17].
Dabek et al. built a distributed file system called CFS (Cooperative File
System) [18] based on their previous work based on Chord [17].
For fault tolerance, there are some replication schemes proposed for Chord
overlay. One of the schemes is neighbor replication. When a node has N
successors, k (k ≤ N) successors have all data replicated in the nodes. For
example, in Fig. 2.5, node ID 70 has two successors. When replicating two
nodes, node ID 120 and 250 also have data ID 55. Then, when node ID 70 is
down or leaves from the network, node ID 120 will be a successor of node ID
20. In addition, data ID 55 is still available by getting a replica from node
ID 120.
There are DHT proposals other from Chord. CAN [19] uses a
d-dimensional Cartesian coordinate space. Pastry [20] uses Plaxton
algorithm. Kademila [21] uses the XOR metric. Building CFS on top of
any of these DHTs is possible.
2.2.1 Security of DHT
There are several discussions on the security of DHT [4]. The attacks for
DHT are mainly three attacks; “Sybil Attack”, “Eclipse Attack”, “Routing
and Storage Attacks.”
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Sybil Attack
Sybil Attack is an attack where some malicious nodes join to a DHT
cluster to achieve control of the DHT. Many nodes just joining is not obstruct
processing the DHT protocol. However, this attack makes several attacks
easier. Security of DHT is guaranteed under an estimation that f of n nodes
in a DHT cluster are honest. An attacker breaks security by deploying virtual
nodes over f in a DHT cluster.
There are several countermeasures to Sybil Attacks. One of the
countermeasures to Sybil Attack is deploying Certification Authority(CA).
A CA authenticate when a node joins a DHT cluster [22, 23]. However,
it needs that every node in the DHT cluster trusts the CA. Therefore, in
this scheme, the CA is a single point failure of the DHT cluster. Another
countermeasure is utilizing physical network characteristics [24, 25, 26].
Generally, an attacker deploys malicious nodes at close to attacker’s other
nodes in the network. utilizing this characteristics, a honest node can classify
nodes by network characteristics. Additionally, honest nodes reject nodes
joining if nodes deployed in nearby malicious nodes try to join. However, the
countermeasure needs trusted network monitoring. From another aspect, a
countermeasure using social networks has been proposed [27]. Before joining
a DHT cluster, operators share a key and nodes authenticate by the key. In
this scheme, each node behaves like a small CA. It needs messaging outside
of the DHT to exchange keys. Other countermeasures use computational
puzzles and game theory [28, 29, 30]. These proposals work under an
estimation that every node are rational. However, attackers process an attack
because they can get profits (sometimes outside the DHT) by breaking the
DHT. The rational countermeasure only on a DHT protocol needs discussion
it is truly practical or not.
Eclipse Attack
Eclipse Attack is an attack makes honest nodes can not lookup correctly
by interrupting DHT lookup fowarding. Firstly, attackers control sufficient
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fraction of the neighbors of honest nodes. For example, the malicious nodes
poisoning a routing table of victim nodes to establish control. Then, the
malicious nodes deceiving the response of the routing table updating request.
As a result, the victim node cannot receive correct responses of a lookup.
Eclipse Attack is also effective to accelerate Routing and Storage Attacks.
We would describe the Routing and Storage Attacks in the next section.
One of the countermeasures is to constrain how to assign the identities on
the routing table. Chord uses this scheme [3]. This scheme would work on
conditions that node identities are random. Moreover, it is also required that
malicious node spread over the DHT overlay. To spread malicious nodes, one
of the schemes is that a CA assigns nodes random IDs. However, random
assigning of identities has a trade-off with performance. In Pastry, there is
optimizing mechanism of proximity neighbor selection [20]. The mechanism
utilizes weak requirements on the top level of the routing table. By adopting
restrictions in the routing table, it is efficient that the network measurement
and ID requirements for optimal neighbors selection. However, there is a
problem that attackers can detect identities by exploiting the restrictions
and the network measurement infrastructure.
Another countermeasure is redundant routing. In the condition that some
node in a routing table are honest nodes, it will allow to keep redundant
routes [31]. Additionally, there is a proposal using a combination of an
identity restriction and redundant routing [22]. This proposal utilizes that an
attacker hijack the restricted routing table after hijacking optimized routing
table. However, this scheme has overheads of using hijacked routing table
and detecting a failure.
Countermeasures for Eclipse Attack have trade-offs between complexity
and performance. Countermeasures need some works outside of DHT
protocols. Therefore, to utilize them, it needs to consider overheads.
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Routing and Storage Attacks
Sybil Attack and Eclipse attack does not directly affect DHT. They
accelerate attacks like refusing to forward a lookup request or responding
incorrect values. Those attacks directly affect DHT. Those attacks are called
“Routing and Storage Attacks.” Generally, an attacker attacks by forwarding
to an incorrect, nonexisting or malicious node. For example, a combination of
attacks described as follows; A node that relays a lookup request deliberately
forward to a malicious node that joining by a Sybil Attack. Since it is easy
to interrupt a routing, an attacker hijacks a routing table of a victim node
by an Eclipse Attacks.
Main countermeasures of Routing and Storage Attacks are redundant
routing and redundant storage. The Multi-Paths or the Multiple Wide Paths
realizes redundant routing [22, 31]. By redundant routing, it guarantees
reachability to honest nodes by keeping routes that does not include malicious
nodes. Replications realize redundant storage. If a malicious node response
incorrect value, nodes can check the correctness of the value by collecting
replicas from several nodes.
There are three major replication schemes; replicating neighbor nodes in
the ID space [22, 31, 32, 33], replicating random nodes in the ID space [34],
and the combination of them [35, 36]. The first scheme is easy to control
the replication level and keeping consistency. However, it assumes that
malicious nodes are spread over the ID space. If malicious nodes concentrate
in a specific network region, a small number of malicious nodes can control
replicas assigned on the network region. From this point of view, the second
scheme is effective. Since the ID assignment scheme in DHT is public, it is
easy to detect the network region assigned a specific key and attack them.
Hence, replication only is not enough as a countermeasure to storage attacks.
It needs to be difficult to figure out where nodes are placed on the network
from IDs.
The main concern to replication is whether replicas have the consistency
or not. Whether each replica has been rewritten or not is verifiable on an
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application level. For example, if a key of a value is determined as a hash
value of the value, the returned value is verifiable by checking the hash value
of the response. The point of checking consistency is whether a node can
verify independently or not. If a node lookup a key-value, and fails to verify
key and response value, the node can choose a value by collecting replicas
and metadata in the application level. There are several selection rules like
choosing the highest version value, voting and so on.
2.3 Summary of This Chapter
In this chapter, we described the elemental technologies of this thesis,
Bitcoin and DHT. Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer cryptocurrency system. By
holding the whole blockchain, Full Node can verify new transactions
independently. To process on lightweight devices, SPV is proposed.
SPV nodes can verify new transactions with relying on Full Nodes.
Cryptocurrency exchange services provide client applications and Full Nodes
on their servers. DHT realizes efficient assignment and lookup among
DHT networked nodes. You can implement distributed storage on top of
DHT. There are some attacks to DHT; “Sybil Attack”, “Eclipse Attack”,
“Routing and Storage Attacks.” To guarantee the security of DHT, several
countermeasures have been proposed and discussed. Next chapter, we point
out the issue we address in this thesis.
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Issues of The Thesis
There are several ways to use Bitcoin; using a Cryptocurrency Exchange
Service, using an SPV node, or using a Full Node. This Chapter describes
them and how the selection effects users. Then, We point out the issue
address in this thesis.
verification
3.1 Node Types and Verifications
When using a Cryptocurrency Exchange Service, users use a client
application for the service. Generally, described as in Fig 2.4, the client
application is not a Bitcoin node. A server of the service provider behaves
as a Full Node. A client only sends a request of Bitcoin payment to the
server. Sever would create and broadcast a transaction to Bitcoin Network.
However, the client can not check whether the server processes the request
or not. In the worst case, the service provider does not create a transaction.
The service provider only updates a database that manages how much Bitcoin
each user holds. Some service provider adopts this scheme because processing
time of each transaction on the Bitcoin network is possibly more than ten
minutes. In this case, the service provider should hold enough amount
Bitcoin. The service provider will create a transaction only when a user
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withdraws Bitcoin outside of the service. In this scheme, there is no reason
to use a cryptocurrency. It is just same as using fiat money and a bank. The
availability for users depends on the server of the service provider. It means
that the service provider is a single point failure.
When using an SPV node, as described in 2.1.3, users can verify a
transaction is included in the Bitcoin blockchain. However, the SPV process
depends on Full Nodes referred by the SPV node. Hence, the availability
of the SPV node depends on the availability of Full Nodes the SPV node
depends on. The SPV scheme is a scheme for resource-constrained devices.
SPV nodes sometimes hold not all block headers of all blocks in the
blockchain. SPV nodes hold only some number of block headers of latest
blocks. SPV nodes cannot resolve all fork. They can resolve forks only if the
forks start from a newer block that includes a block header the SPV node
holds.
To verify transactions and blocks independently, and to resolve forks,
a user needs to deploy a Full Node. By this scheme, a user can check
independently whether a transaction is verified and included in a blockchain
or not. To operate as Full Nodes, devices need enough size of storage for
holding the whole blockchain.
3.2 Issue of Storage
In the existing schemes, if a user wants to know independently whether
a transaction is included in a blockchain or not, the user should operate a
Full Node. When the user operates an SPV node, the user cannot process
verification correctly if a Full Node that the SPV node depends on falsifies
block headers and Markle trees. However, a Full Node needs enough storage
capacity for storing the whole blockchain. On the other hand, users can not
estimate enough storage capacity due to the nature of the append-only data
structure of the blockchain. Hence, the user cannot operate a Full Node on
a storage resource-constrained devices.
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To address this issue, two requirements should be satisfied; One
is to reduce the required storage size. Generally, the storage of a
resouce-constrained device is built in and difficult to expand. Therefore,
storage resource-constrained devices like smartphones cannot be append
storage capacity. Additionally, from append-only characteristics, a
blockchain would use up the storage eventually. Hence, to keep the node
working, the storage needs to be scalable for holding the entire of the
blockchain.
Another requirement is the independent verification transactions and
blocks. The existing lightweight scheme SPV nodes rely on Full Nodes. As a
result, the availability of an SPV node depends on Full Nodes. Additionally,
SPV nodes cannot detect even if a Full Node maliciously sends a fake part of
Markle tree. A malicious Full Node can send a fake transaction and a fake
part of Markle tree as if the fake transactions is included in a blockchain.
To detect fake transactions, a node needs to check independently with the
whole blockchain.
3.3 Summary of This Chapter
In this chapter, we pointed out the issues of this thesis. When a user uses
Bitcoin, a user can select options; operate a Full Node, operate an SPV node,
use a client of a cryptocurrency exchange service. The latter two depend on
other nodes. In other words, the user cannot independently verify whether his
transaction is processed or not. To verify independently, user should operate
a Full Node. However, it is difficult to keep operating a Full Node on a storage
resource-constrained device because of the append-only characteristic of the
blockchain. Hence, there are requirements for verifying transactions on a
storage resource-constrained device; independent verification, and reduction
of required storage capacity. In the next section, we propose new scheme for
storage resource-constrained devices.
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Proposed Scheme:
KARAKASA
To address the issue described in Chapter 3, we propose a new scheme
“KARAKASA1;” load-sharing required storage capacity for each node by
holding the whole blockchain among DHT clustered Bitcoin nodes. As
Fig. 4.1 shows, Users who operate storage resource-constrained devices
collaborate their devices with each other and forms DHT clusters in a Bitcoin
network. Each Bitcoin node in the cluster holds a part of blockchain assigned
according to the DHT algorithm. When verifying new transactions and
blocks, each node query the required block to the DHT cluster. Therefore,
each node in the cluster can verify new transactions and blocks the same
as Full Nodes. In this thesis, we discuss our scheme implemented on top of
Chord. We call a DHT cluster of this scheme KARAKASA cluster, and call
a node in a DHT cluster KARAKASA node.
1The naming was inspired by Karakasa Renban Jo (傘連判状). Karakasa Renban
Jo is a round robin scheme at middle ages (Shogun Era) in Japan. People who tried
to revolution used this round-robin scheme. By arranging signatures in a ring, it made
difficult to estimate who was a leader of the revolution. It was a load-balancing scheme of
a responsibility.
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Bitcoin Overlay
DHT Overlay
KARAKASA  
Cluster A
KARAKASA  
Cluster B
Figure 4.1: Sample Node Topology with KARAKASA Scheme; Some
resource-constrained devices form DHT clusters. KARAKASA nodes can
join the Bitcoin network the same as Full Nodes. Each KARAKASA nodes
verify new blocks and new transactions by referring a blockchain distributed
stored in the KARAKASA cluster. This figure is showing two KARAKASA
clusters.
4.1 Node Architecture
Bitcoin nodes have two storage; “BlockStorage” stores actual block data,
and “ChainState” stores UTXOs. To verify new transactions efficiently,
nodes forms “UTXOset” in the node memory. We propose KARAKASA
nodes keeps “BlockStorage” among DHT clustered nodes. When a
KARAKASA node verifies new transactions, nodes only query to UTXOset.
When blocks contradicting with a block in the blockchain are received,
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KARAKASA nodes query a contradicting block to the KARAKASA cluster
to resolve the fork. This architecture makes nodes can behave same as Full
Nodes in the verification process of transactions and blocks. By distributedly
keeping the whole blockchain, the requirement for storage capacity for a node
decrease.
Next, we discuss how to map blocks in the blockchain to a Chord overlay
network. Fig. 4.2 shows how blocks are mapped onto a Chord ring. To
map blocks onto the Chord ring, the ID of each block in the Chord ring is
determined by cryptographic hash function. Therefore, as Fig. 4.2 shows,
the same KARAKASA node does not always store consecutive blocks. The
replication guarantees fault tolerance.
Cryptographic Hash Function
Hash
TX
TX
TX
Hash
TX
TX
TX
Hash
TX
TX
TX
Figure 4.2: Blockchain on a Chord overlay network
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It can be considered that a malicious KARAKASA node falsifies response
for a block. In KARAKASA scheme, a node in the cluster lookups a block
by an ID. The ID is calculated by a cryptographic hash function. Thus,
honest nodes can detect rewriting by checking the ID and the hash of the
response. When detect rewriting, the KARAKASA node can get the block
from other nodes which replicate the block. Therefore, a malicious node needs
to rewrite all of the replicas for successful rewrite. Therefore, replication
schemes provide better tamper resistance.
4.2 Bootstrapping and Scaling Process of a
KARAKASA Cluster
When a node initializes a KARAKASA cluster, the bootstrapping process
is like follows; First, create a DHT cluster consists of a single initial node.
Second, the block retrieving process is the same as described in Section 2.1.5.
In this block retrieving process, the initial node stores verified blocks in local.
Since no other nodes have joined to the DHT cluster, storage in the initial
node stores the whole blockchain. When another node joins the DHT cluster,
the DHT stabilizing process assigns a part of the blockchain to the new node.
In the process that a node joins a DHT cluster, a node behave same
as restarting Bitcoin process described in Section 2.1.5. Therefore, a
new KARAKASA node needs to lookup all blocks from the KARAKASA
cluster. Comparing with a Full Node, there is lookup overheads for building
UTXOset. To achieve constant the lookup overheads, the new node needs
enough time for the DHT stabilizing process to complete.
To secure a KARAKASA cluster, it needs countermeasure to attacks.
A countermeasure to Sybil Attack is most needed. We adopt a scheme to
guarantee the security of DHT described while Section 2.2.1 in bootstrapping
and scaling process of a KARAKASA cluster. In our scheme, to refuse
random hosts, an initial node configures cluster key. The initial node tells
the key to other nodes. KARAKASA nodes authorize other nodes by the key
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in the join process. Using this scheme, the joining is restricted by whether
the key shared or not. Curently, in this thesis, the key sharing depends on
the operator’s social network [27]. Intoroduction of better key share shceme
is out of scope of this thesis.
4.3 Summary of This Chapter
In this chapter, we proposed a new scheme “KARAKASA” to operate
storage resource-constrained devices as like Full Node. In KARAKASA
scheme, storage resource-constrained devices form a DHT cluster. The
devices distributedly keep the whole blockchain among the DHT cluster. By
DHT scheme, A KARAKASA node can retrieve required data in verification
of transactions and blocks. Additionally, the replication scheme of DHT
guarantees fault tolerance. In the bootstrapping and the scaling process of
KARAKASA cluster, initial node configures a key to refuse that random
hosts join. Those security schemes for DHT is available in KARAKASA
scheme.
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Evaluation Plan
In this Chapter, we describe the point of views on the evaluation
of KARAKASA scheme. KARAKASA scheme is a scheme for verifying
transactions and blocks processing on a node while reducing required storage
capacity for the node. Hence, we compare form two standpoints; First, as a
performance evaluation, how much storage capacities are required and how
overhead appear. Second, as a security point of view, whether a node can
verify transactions and blocks like Full Node or not.
5.1 Storage Capacity
As described in Chapter 3, blockchain size would keep growing
because of append-only characteristics of blockchain. Generally, storage of
resource-constrained devices are built-in to the devices. Thus, it is typically
difficult to keep adding enough storage to storage resource-constrained
devices. Thus, a user cannot operate a storage resource constrained-devices
as Full Node.
KARAKASA scheme addresses the issue by storage load-balancing among
DHT networked nodes. Thus, we evaluate the required amount of storage
for a node. Moreover, we also analyze overhead for the distributed store
of the whole blockchain in Bitcoin scenario. By reduction of the required
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storage capacity for a node, storage resource-constrained devices may store
the verification of transactions and blocks on its local storage.
5.2 Independent Verification of Transactions
and Blocks
Originally, in Bitcoin design, the verification process of transactions and
blocks are independent with other nodes. As described in Section 2.1.3, Full
Nodes can verify independently with referring the local storage. To process
a Bitcoin node on a storage resource-constrained device, SPV node needs to
trust Full Nodes that it refers. However, when the Full Node that an SPV
node rely on is dishonest, the SPV node verify transactions as correct even
though transactions are in-correct. In other words, to reduce the required
storage capacity, the SPV nodes does not keep the independent verification
of transactions and blocks.
KARAKASA scheme aims to achieve both the reduction of required
storage capacity and the independent verification of transactions and blocks.
To achieve them, KARAKASA scheme utilizes characteristics of DHT. Thus,
whether a KARAKASA node is independent or not depends on whether a
DHT networked node is independent or not. Originally, in design scheme of
DHT, DHT networked nodes can behave independently from other nodes.
Thus, KARAKASA nodes can be considered that KARAKASA nodes can
behave independently. The several attacks described in Section 2.2.1 obstruct
DHT process so that nodes can not behave independently. Therefore, we
considered that the independent verification of KARAKASA nodes is affected
by the security of DHT. For example, if the node cannot retrieve a block from
a KARAKASA cluster, a KARAKASA node cannot verify transactions and
blocks. Thus, We analyze the security of DHT in Bitcoin scenario as the
analysis of the independent verification.
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5.3 Summary of This Chapter
In this chapter, we described the evaluation plan of KARAKASA scheme.
The points are storage capacity for a node and independent verification of
transaction and blocks. KARAKASA scheme aims to achieve both of the
reduction of required storage capacity and the independent verification of
transactions and blocks. To achieve them, KARAKASA scheme utilizes
characteristics of DHT. Thus, whether a KARAKASA node is independent
or not depends on whether a DHT networked node is independent or not.
Therefore, we analyze the security of DHT in Bitcoin scenario as the analysis
of the independent verification on KARAKASA nodes. In the next chapter,
we analyze the two aspects of KARAKASA scheme.
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Analysis of KARAKASA
In this chapter, we analyze KARAKASA scheme from two aspects
described in Chapter 5. Firstly, we analyze KARAKASA scheme in terms of
storage capacity, and messaging overhead among KARAKASA nodes for
performance analysis. Secondly, we analyze the independent verification
of transactions and blocks on a KARAKASA node. For analyzing the
independent verification, we discuss the security of DHT in the Bitcoin
scenario.
6.1 Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the performance of KARAKASA scheme. We
analyzed the performance of KARAKASA scheme in the two points of view;
storage capacity in a node and messaging overhead among KARAKASA
nodes. We estimated common simulation parameters, then simulated
KARAKASA scheme by Overlay Weaver [37]. Table 6.1 shows the common
simulation parameters. In Bitcoin, the largest block size is 1MB. Thus,
we defined BlockSize as 1MB. N is the number of nodes in the simulated
network. Suc shows the number of successors in a routing table that a node
refers. R specify the number of replicas created.
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Table 6.1: Simulation Parameters
Symbol Restriction Description
BlockSize BlockSize = 1MB
Size of a Block
in bytes
BlockCount BlockCount ≥ 1 Number of Blocks
in a Bitcoin blockchain
N none
Number of Node
in a cluster
Suc N − 1 ≥ Suc Number of Successors a node has
R (Suc ≥ R) Number of replicas
6.1.1 Storage Capacity
In this section, we estimated storage capacity for a KARAKASA node.
We verify the estimation by simulation. In the simulation, we adopt the
parameter in the Bitcoin network.
Estimation
We estimated the required storage capacity in a KARAKASA node.
When a Full Node store the whole blockchain, the storage capacity of the
Full Node is
StorageCapacityFullNode ≈ BlockCount ·BlockSize (6.1)
In our proposal, each KARAKASA nodes keeps a part of the blockchain.
As we described in Chapter 4, the ID of a block is the result of a cryptographic
hash function. The results of a cryptographic hash function consist of a
uniform distribution. Therefore, in KARAKASA scheme, a number of blocks
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that a node holds also consist of uniform distribution. Without considering
replication, the storage capacity of a KARAKASA node is as follows:
StorageCapacityKARAKASANode ≈ BlockCount ·BlockSize
N
(6.2)
With KARAKASA scheme, replication is required for fault tolerance. For
the evaluation for replication, we simulated replication scheme described in
Section 2.2. Storage capacity depends on numbers of replicas created. The
storage capacity of the KARAKASA node can be calculated as follows;
StorageCapacityKARAKASANodeWithReplication
≈ BlockCount ·BlockSize
N
+
BlockCount ·BlockSize
N
·R
=
BlockCount ·BlockSize
N
· (R + 1) (6.3)
A formula of estimating storage amount is just a simple linear equation to the
number of nodes (N). When KARAKASA nodes replicate all blocks, storage
amount is the same as Full Nodes. This situation means every KARAKASA
node keeps the whole blockchain.
Experiment
To verify our estimation, we selected simulation parameters from the
current Bitcoin network. In March 2018, the number of nodes in the
Bitcoin network is about 11500 [38], and highest block number is about
512000 [39]. Thus, We simulated the storage capacity when storing 512000
blocks (BlockCount) with active number of nodes in 500 nodes to 1000 nodes
in 100 intervals (N). Fig. 6.1 shows the simulation result. As expected in
Formula 6.2, more nodes in the KARAKASA cluster, fewer blocks are stored
in one node. Therefore, more nodes in the KARAKASA cluster, the smaller
storage capacity required.
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Figure 6.1: Node Number vs storage Capacity: This figure shows simulation
result closed to estimated values.
Then, we simulated the storage capacity with replication. We set the
number of nodes in a KARAKASA cluster (N) to 1000, and the number of
blocks (BlockCount) to 50000. Fig. 6.2 shows the simulation result of the
relationship between replication node number and storage capacity. It shows
that the more replication nodes are, the more storage capacity is needed. It
is nearby with our estimation (Formula 6.3).
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Figure 6.2: Replication vs Storage Capacity
6.1.2 Messaging Overhead
We analyzed messaging overhead for querying the DHT in Bitcoin
scenario.
Estimation
In our proposal, each of the KARAKASA nodes hold a part of
“BlockStorage.” On the other hand, the UTXOset is not distributed. Hence,
when nodes verify a new block or new transactions, nodes do not query the
KARAKASA cluster. When nodes resolve a fork of the blockchain, nodes
query the starting block of the fork. Thus, if using Chord, the number of
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messages as overhead is as follows:
OverheadForReadingABlock ≈ O(logN) (6.4)
When a node builds UTXOset from the whole blockchain, the node needs
to read all blocks in a blockchain. This process happens in joining process to
KARAKASA cluster. Then, the number of the message to build UTXOset
is as follows;
OverheadforbuildingUTXOset ≈ BlockCount ∗ O(logN) (6.5)
This formula is a linear equation to BlockCount. Hence, as blockchain grows,
the cost will be higher. There is a need to consider the messaging overhead.
Experiment
We simulated reading all blocks when the number of nodes (N) is 1000
and the number of blocks (BlockCount) in 1000 to 5000 in 1000 interval.
Fig. 6.3 shows the results for each BlockCount simulated ten times each.
It shows that message overhead looks like a linear equation to BlockCount,
same as our estimation (Formula 6.5).
6.2 Analysis of Independent Verification of
Transactions and Blocks
To achieve the independent verification of transactions and Blocks, nodes
need to access historical transactions and blocks correctly. KARAKASA
scheme utilizes DHT scheme to distribute data among nodes. Thus, the
independent verification is affected by the security of storage based on DHT.
As described in Section 2.2.1, main attacks for DHT are Sybil Attack,
Eclipse Attack, Routing and Storage Attacks. The KARAKASA scheme
utilizes social network countermeasures for Sybil Attack as described in
Section 4.2. Like that, some countermeasures described in section 2.2.1 for
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Figure 6.3: Message Overhead for building UTXOset
eclipse attacks are available. In this section, we discuss the KARAKASA
scheme on Chord. Chord has some stabilizing process for churns [40].
In the Bitcoin context, the main concern is the transaction rewriting
attack by utilizing Routing and Storage Attacks. We describe how to manage
the transaction rewriting attack in a KARAKASA scheme and effects.
6.2.1 Transaction Rewriting Attack
One of the attacks is rewriting a particular transaction in a block. Thus,
when an attacker rewrites transactions, a hash value of the block that includes
the transactions would change. A hash value of the block determines the ID
of a block on KARAKASA cluster. Therefore, by checking hash values of
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response and the ID used for retrieving, a KARAKASA node can detect
whether the response is faked or not. Hence, just rewriting a transaction
does not work effectively. Additionally, if rewriting is detected, a node that
lookup a block can get replications. Even if some of the replicas are also
faked, nodes can take the correct replica so that the ID used for retrieving is
same as the hash value of replica.
To succeed the rewriting attack, an attacker needs to access all
KARAKASA nodes that keep a block including a target transaction. The
KARAKASA nodes keep a part of the whole blockchain. Thus, the attacker
needs to search a block include the target transaction first. Moreover, the
attacker needs to search a node keeping the block. Those requirements
are overheads of the attack comparing to attacking a single Full Node.
As described in the previous paragraph, the attacker needs to rewrite all
replications. Hence, the attacker also needs to lookup nodes that replicate
the block.
By the hash chain structure of blockchain, If a block in a blockchain is
rewritten, the following block also changes. Therefore, an attack does not
succeed only by rewriting a block including a target transaction. The attacker
needs to rewrite all blocks stacked on the rewritten block. The generalized
situation is following; An attacker wants to rewrite a transaction. N blocks
are stacked on the block that includes the target transaction. A KARAKASA
cluster creates Replica number of replicas. Due to this design, the attacker
needs to rewrite Rplica ·N blocks. It means that more blocks are stacked on
a block, an attacker needs to rewrite more data. In other words, the security
parameter is count of the replica times count of stacked blocks. As described
in Section 6.1.1, more replication needs more storage capacity. Thus, there
is a trade-off between storage capacity and security.
6.2.2 Effect of Transaction Rewriting Attack
Even if an attacker succeeded in a transaction rewriting attack, it means
just that some nodes in the Bitcoin network accept rewritten blocks. In the
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proposed scheme, a KARAKASA cluster is a part of the Bitcoin network.
Hence, even if an attack to a KARAKASA cluster is a success, the rewritten
transaction is not accepted by other nodes. To be accepted to other nodes
in the Bitcoin network, the block that includes the rewritten transaction
needs to be accepted. In other words, it needs that all nodes take the
block as a correct block. It requires spending computation power because of
Proof-of-Work consensus scheme. Hence, just rewriting a transaction is not
enough as an attack.
On the other hand, in the double-spending attack, the rewriting attack
has some effects. The author of this thesis showed in the previous work that
the model of the double-spending attack and its incentive model [41]. In
the process of the double-spending attack, the attacker needs that a victim
cannot detect a payment that is contradicting to payment to the victim.
The propagation delay of transactions and blocks and the storage rewriting
attack create this situation. If rewriting storage of the victim’s node, the
victim verifies a transaction correctly even though other nodes fail to verify.
By communicating with other nodes and the fork resolving scheme, the
victim would notice that verification is wrong. In this thesis, the incentive
model of double-spending attack is out of scope. However, that analysis on
KARAKASA scheme is necessary.
6.2.3 Conclusion of Analysis of Independent
Verification
By utilizing characteristics and security advantage of DHT with
replication, the transaction rewriting attack does not work. Thus, storage
based on DHT can be considered as secure even though distributedly store
the whole blockchain. In other words, a KARAKASA node does not
need to trust other nodes in the same KARAKASA cluster. Additionally,
the KARAKASA node also does not need to trust nodes outside the
KARAKASA cluster. The KARAKASA node can verify new transactions
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and blocks with referring the whole blockchain in the KARAKASA cluster.
Hence, we conclude KARAKASA nodes keep the independent verification of
transactions and Blocks.
6.3 Summary of This Chapter
In this chapter, we analyzed two aspects of KARAKASA scheme;
performance and the independent verification. As a performance analysis, we
estimate and simulate KARAKASA scheme. As a result, a required storage
capacity for a KARAKASA node is reduced compared with Full Node. On
the other hand, messaging overhead is like a linear equation to count of blocks
in a blockchain. As an analysis of the independent verification, we discussed
the security of DHT in Bitcoin scenario. Especially, we concluded that a
transaction rewriting attack does not work on KARAKASA cluster. As a
result, KARAKASA scheme satisfies to reduce required storage capacity for
a node and to keep the independent verification of transactions and blocks.
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Discussion
In this chapter, we evaluate the KARAKASA scheme by compare with
Full Nodes, and SPV nodes. KARAKASA scheme is a scheme for verification
of transactions and blocks processing on the local of a node for reducing
a required storage amount for one node. Hence, we compare form two
standpoints; First, how much storage capacities needed. Second, whether
a node of each scheme can verify transactions and blocks independently or
not. Table 7.1 shows the summary of the characteristics of each scheme.
Table 7.1: Summery of Characteristics
Node Type Storage Capacity Verification of TXs and Blocks
Full Node ·Full Blockchain ·Independently & locally
KARAKASA
Node
·A part of Blockchain
·Scalable with scaling
node number in the cluster
·Independently on new TXs
·Resolving Fork depends on
Replication count
in a KARAKASA cluster
SPV Node ·Blockheaders ·Depends on a Full Node
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7.1 Comparison with Existing Schemes
In this section, we compare KARAKASA node, Full Node, and SPV
node. With referring analysis in Chapter 6, we point out some advantages
of KARAKASA scheme.
7.1.1 Storage Capacity
We describe the estimation of the required storage capacity for Full Node,
SPV and KARAKASA. In Section 6.1.1, the storage capacity required for
Full Node and KARAKASA node was shown. In this section, we also describe
and compare with the storage capacity of an SPV node.
Table 7.2: Storage Parameters
Symbol Unit Description Constant or Variable
BlockSize MB
Data size
of a Block
1 MB Maximum
Blockheader Bytes
Data size
of a Blockheader
80 Bytes
Blockcontent MB
Data size
of TXs in a block
Variable
BlockCount Block
Block count
in a blockchain
Variable
Parameters for estimating storage is shown in Table 7.2. In Bitcoin, the
largest block size is 1MB. In Block data structure, Blockheader occupies
80 bytes. The size of list of transactions included in a block is described
as Blockcontent. Block count in the blockchain is BlockCount. The size of
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blockchain BlockchainSize is shown as follows;
Block = Blockheader + Blockcontent (7.1)
BlockchainSize = BlockCount ·BlockSize (7.2)
As described in 2.1.3, an SPV node hold block headers. Therefore, the storage
capacity for an SPV node BlcokchainSizeSPV is like follows;
BlockchainSizeSPV = BlockCount ·Blockheader (7.3)
KARAKASA node distributedly store the whole blockchain. As a result,
when operators want to deploy N nodes, the required storage capacity is only
Blockchain. In the case of Full Nodes, the capacity is as follows;
BlockchainSize ·N (7.4)
In the case of SPV nodes, the capacity is as follows;
BlockchainSizeSPV ·N (7.5)
Therefore, KARAKASA scheme required storage capacity lower than Full
Nodes. Additionally, storage based on DHT is scalable. Thus, the
KARAKASA scheme has an advantage that the required storage capacity
does not become larger even with nodes scaling. Theoretically, the total
storage capacity for KARAKASA is lower than SPV nodes when N is over
1MB/80Bytes = 13421772. However, DHTs have not been verified to work
on those number of nodes.
7.1.2 Independent Verification of Transactions and
Blocks
In this section, we discuss the independent verification of transactions
and Blocks on each scheme. Full Nodes are independent because Full Nodes
can process verification by referring to the whole blockchain in the local
44
CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION
storage. Therefore, Full Nodes do not need to trust other nodes. On the
other hand, an SPV node depends on Full Nodes. Thus, an SPV node cannot
independently verify transactions and blocks.
With the proposed scheme, a KARAKASA node can verify a new
transaction using UTXOset in the local possession. In historical transaction
and block verification, the node query the required information to
KARAKASA cluster. The query happens when a KARAKASA node tries
to resolve a fork. KARAKASA scheme adopts DHT to KVS of BlockStorage
in a Bitcoin node. When a KARAKASA node query to the DHT cluster
is the same as a Full Node queries to the local storage. Therefore,
verification processes of transaction and block are also same. In other words,
a KARAKASA node does not need to trust other nodes outside of the
KARAKASA cluster.
As described in Section 6.2.1, if a node in a KARAKASA cluster rewrites
a transaction, other nodes can detect whether the transaction is rewritten
or not. Additionally, other nodes can get the transaction that has not been
modified from other nodes that keep replicas. Therefore, by adopting schemes
securing DHT cluster, there are no need to establish trusts in the DHT
cluster. The trust problem of KARAKASA scheme is the same as the trust
of storage of a Full Node. It means that the Full Node needs to trust the
local storage. If an attacker rewrites the local storage of a Full Node, the
Full Node can detect the rewriting as same as described in Section 6.2.1.
To secure DHT, it needs replications. On the other hand, it can also be
considered that Full Nodes are replicating the whole blockchain for security.
Thus, the replication in a KARAKASA cluster is the same as Full Node.
Replication in KARAKASA scheme is achieved by the storage layer. On
the other hand, Full Nodes replicates the whole node. In Section 6.1.1, we
described that KARAKASA scheme has a trade-off between replication and
storage capacity. Therefore, there is a trade-off between security and storage
capacity. By adopting the proposed scheme, operators can balance security
and storage capacity on storage resource-constrained devices.
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7.2 Summary of This Chapter
In this chapter, we compared KARAKASA node, Full Node, and SPV
node. We compared from two points of view described in Chapter 5. As
the result of comparison of storage capacity, a KARAKASA node requires
less storage capacity than a Full Node. Compare with an SPV node,
when a KARAKASA cluster consists of over 13421772 nodes, required
storage capacity for a KARAKASA node is smaller than an SPV node.
From the viewpoint of the independent verification, KARAKASA node can
independently verify transactions and blocks. The independent verification
is achieved by utilizing characteristics and security schemes of DHT. Then,
we conclude that KARAKASA node achieved the requirement described
in Chapter 3. In the next chapter, we introduce some related works of
KARAKASA.
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Related Works
In this chapter, we introduce some related works of KARAKASA. There
are some works evaluate blockchain systems [42, 43, 44]. Applying those
scheme, we plan to evaluate the effect of the difference of DHT algorithms.
We also need to find suitable DHT algorithm for KARAKASA scheme.
8.1 Adopting DHT to Bitcoin and
Blockchain
There are several proposals applying DHT for blockchain. Kaneko et al.
proposed a DHT clustering scheme for load balancing considering blockchain
data size [45]. In their scheme, Bitcoin nodes are classified into two types;
Mining nodes and data nodes. Data nodes verify transactions and blocks
while holding the whole blockchain among a DHT cluster. Mining nodes
work on mining with collecting transactions that are verified by data nodes.
Data nodes are connected with each other by a DHT structured network.
Data nodes are connected also by an unstructured network of Bitcoin. Since
the verification of transactions is processed only by DHT networked data
nodes, the propagation of transaction is processed rapidly according to the
DHT network configuration. Comparing with KARAKASA scheme, in their
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scheme, the verification works are processed on a part of Bitcoin nodes.
All KARAKASA nodes can verify all transactions and blocks by retrieving
required data from the KARAKASA cluster. The independent verification
is an advantage of KARAKASA scheme.
Frey et al. proposed that reducing storage capacity of an SVP node
by mapping UTXOset in a DHT cluster [46]. Their proposal makes SVP
nodes to verify transactions locally. They sharded UTXOset on DHT.
Additionally, they embedded a hash of the hash list of blocks and a hash
of shard onto a block data. With their scheme, each node is able to verify
whether others rewrite the assgined part of UTXOset or not. KARAKASA
scheme shards BlockStorage, not UTXOset. Their proposal focused on the
reduction of storage capacity of SPV nodes. Thus, same as existing SPV
node, their proposed SPV nodes need to rely on Full Nodes. In KARAKASA
scheme, KARAKASA nodes does not need to rely on other nodes. Therefore,
KARAKASA nodes keeps the independent verification even though keeping
a whole blockchain distributedly.
Benshoof et al. proposed Distributed Decentralized Domain Name
Service(DDDNS) [47]. Their work is based on [48, 49, 50] that implements
DNS on DHT. They applied a blockchain to DNS to authentication of record
of domain name ownership. In their work, they suggested using the DHT
overlay as the blockchain network overlay.
8.2 Light Weight Nodes and Sharding
Dorri et al. applied Blockchain technology to Internet-of-Things
(IoT) [51, 52, 53]. They proposed Lightweight Scalable Blockchain
(LSB) [54]. LSB is optimized for smart home architecture. In the smart
home, resources of smart devices are limited on bandwidth and latency. The
authors made a centralized manager to manage all incoming and outgoing
request from resource-constrained devices. On the other hand, this thesis
focuses on the reduction of storage capacity. It is possible to apply our scheme
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to smart devices to make local blockchain node in the smart home. Then,
we can guarantee the integrity of data from smart devices and a centralized
manager in the home while achieving better availability.
OmniLedger is one of the implementations of blockchains [55, 56, 57].
OmniLedger is scalable on the process on Full Node by sharding. The
verification process of the transaction is sharded among some nodes.
Ethereum is also planned to apply sharding [58, 59]. In KARAKASA scheme,
the verification process is executable by every node in the cluster. To make
Bitcoin scalable, sharding verification process is also essential. As one of our
future work, we would optimize the process as well as storage capacity.
8.3 DHT Applications and Evaluations
Katari et al. evaluated and compared some replication schemes [60].
They classified replication schemes into three patterns. Firstly, “Neighbor
Replication” that replicate a data to a neighbor of the node assigned.
Secondly, “Path Replication” replicate a data to a node on routing path look
up. Thirdly, “Multi Publication Key Replication” that the data is assigned
some IDs and is stored in some node that each ID assigned. Each scheme
has different features. Landsiedel et al. evaluated fault tolerance of DHTs
that replicated some scheme in churn condition [61]. They described that
more replication in the cluster, more strong fault tolerance. We evaluated
KARAKASA scheme by simulation by referring current parameter of the
Bitcoin network. We need to evaluate churn tolerance of KARAKASA
scheme along the Bitcoin scenario.
DHTs provide efficient lookup of key-values in distributed nodes. There
are several works evaluate DHTs [62, 63]. Storage based on DHT is
structured on the overlay network. Hence, when nodes lookup a value, nodes
communicate with each other to find the value. In this situation, latency
and message loss may be significant. It is affected by real network topology,
how a device connecting to the network and so on. We need to apply those
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works to Bitcoin scenarios. For example, we should consider how latency is
forgiven for resource-constrained devices Bitcoin client.
8.4 Summary of This Chapter
In this chapter, we introduced related works of KARAKASA. The
proposed scheme adoption DHT to Bitcoin and blockchain is that lightweight
nodes rely on Full Node while load-balancing storage capacity. The advantage
of KARAKASA is that nodes can behave independently. Other lightweight
node proposals focus on sharding verification process of transactions and
blocks as well as storage capacity. We can consider a combination of
KARAKASA and those schemes for scale-up of Bitcoin performance. In
adopting DHT to applications, there are several studies about replication
and performance evaluation of DHT. We should consider the more practical
evaluation of KARAKASA by adopting those studies. In the next chapter,
we conclude this thesis and point out some future works of KARAKASA.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, we conclude the thesis. We describe summery of the
proposed scheme KARAKASA, and contoribution of the scheme. Finally,
we point out some future works for KARAKASA scheme.
9.1 Summery of the Proposed Scheme
This thesis proposed KARAKASA scheme that is a storage load balancing
scheme among DHT clustered nodes. To independently verify transactions
and blocks, existing schemes need to hold the whole blockchain. Otherwise,
a node needs to rely on a Full Node. KARAKASA scheme made a node
available to verify transactions and blocks independently with reducing the
required storage capacity. The simulation of the KARAKASA scheme showed
the size assigned a KARAKASA node was reduced. Security analysis showed
that a node could detect rewriting assigned transactions in a malicious node
in the KARAKASA cluster. Additionally, replication can guarantee the
availability of a block. Therefore, KARAKASA nodes also keep independent
verification of transaction and blocks.
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9.2 Contribution
By KARAKASA scheme, an operator of a storage resource-constrained
node can verify a Bitcoin transaction is processed correctly or not. Nowadays,
the cryptocurrency exchange service provides a Full Node as a trustable
endpoint. However, the benefit of Bitcoin is that a node that a user uses
as an endpoint can independently verify transactions and blocks. The
scheme of cryptocurrency exchange services requires users to trust their
service. Therefore, the scheme of cryptocurrency exchange services is
contradicting to Bitcoin idea. Ideally, all nodes in the Bitcoin network
should be Full Nodes. However, the blockchain scheme has append-only
characteristics. Therefore, estimating enough storage capacity is impossible.
The KARAKASA nodes can verify transactions and blocks independently.
Hence, users can operate a KARAKASA node as an endpoint even though a
storage resource-constrained devices.
9.3 Future Works
At the end of this thesis, we point out some future works of KARAKASA
scheme. In this decade, Bitcoin scaling problem has been on discussions.
With resolving future works, KARAKASA scheme would be one of the
solutions.
9.3.1 Messaging Overheads
In Section 6.1.2, we pointed out the messaging overhead of building
UTXOset would be linear to BlockCount. When the BlockCount becomes
too large, the overhead would be large. From append-only characteristics
of the blockchain, it is inevitable. Hence, KARAKASA scheme, just only
distributed store based on DHT, is not complete. As a future work, we
should consider the messaging overhead. The key element of the future work
is the routing table and efficiency of DHT. We should discuss which DHT
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architecture is suitable for KARAKASA scheme with Bitcoin scenarios.
9.3.2 Relationship between Security and Replication
In Section 6.2, we pointed out enough replication would be essential
to make KARAKASA secure. How replication is enough for DHT is
discussed [64, 65]. We consider that we can determine the security parameter
from how fault tolerance is required. The security of Bitcoin node is on the
discussions [66]. We should consult those works to discuss the security of
KARAKASA.
9.3.3 Bitcoin Ecosystem with KARAKASA
In association with a security discussion of cryptocurrency exchange
services, we should discuss where should set trust endpoint on Bitcoin.
The endpoint needs to hold the whole blockchain. Adopting KARAKASA
scheme, storage resource-constrained devices can be endpoints. The level
of trust on endpoints is important. For example, we should discuss where
to place the endpoint; at each user’s devices, or each home, at each area.
Nowadays, users should choose a Full Node, an SPV node, a client of
cryptocurrency exchange services. The latter two depend on a trusted third
party. A KARAKASA node is one of the new other options. The storage
capacity required for the KARAKASA node was reduced. However, it is
still larger than an SPV node. In another aspect, KARAKASA node is
independently same as Full Nodes. There is no trust anchor to other nodes
with enough replications. Comparing with SPV nodes, the independent
verification is an advantage. A Bitcoin ecosystem design with those node
types is one of future works.
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